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THE INSIDIOUS REMNANTS OF STATE RULES 
RESPECTING CAPITAL FORMATION 
RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.* 
As we move into the Twenty-First Century, state blue sky laws and 
regulations continue to govern a significant portion of the capital formation 
activities of our domestic businesses. As a result, state administrators, 
influenced by their historically informed preferences and local traditions, 
continue to play important roles when businesses attempt to access external 
capital sources.  
Today, however, the effects of state blue sky laws, regulations, and 
administrators on capital formation are felt almost exclusively by small 
businesses.1 The capital formation activities of larger businesses generally 
have been freed from state control, most recently by the preemption 
contained in the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
(NSMIA).2 
Although allowing states to retain control over smaller, local concerns 
while giving the federal government jurisdiction over larger, national 
enterprises may have a sensible ring to it, such a split system in fact is 
unsound. First, the system is inherently discriminatory against small 
businesses. When small businesses attempt to raise capital, they may be 
subject to more than fifty sets of laws and regulations, while larger 
corporations are subject to only one. Such discrimination is not only unfair to 
 
 
 * Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author is 
indebted to Herbert Joseph Stapleton and Charlotte Hill Turner for their able research assistance. 
 1. Although a precise definition of “small” or “large” business is difficult , small businesses 
generally have two characteristics that distinguish them from large businesses. First, small businesses 
are small as an economic matter, and one, roughly, can measure this by the number of assets or the 
revenue stream of the business. Second, small businesses have limited trading in their securities. These 
characteristics generate many of the problems unique to small businesses in their efforts to generate 
external capital. 
 2. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Even before NSMIA, state control over the 
capital formation activities of larger corporations had waned somewhat. An example of this is the 
provision in the Uniform Secur ities Act providing an exemption from state registration requirements 
for securities that are registered for trading on certain national exchanges. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 
402(a)(8), 7B U.L.A. 600 (1985). Additionally, the exemption extends to “any other security of the 
same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank.” Id. Most states expanded this exemption by 
regulation to include securities traded on the NASDAQ Nation Market System. See Exchange 
Exemptions,  1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6401 (Oct. 1996) (stating that 46 states have adopted such a 
marketplace exemption). One participant in this symposium has written on the marketplace exemption. 
See Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Statutes of the Marketplace Exemption from State Securities 
Registration, 41 BUS. LAW. 1511 (1986). See also  Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 471, 474-75 (1993). 
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small entrepreneurs but also leads to inefficiencies and misallocations of 
societal resources. The increased transaction costs generated by complying 
with multiple securities regimes make small companies less competitive in 
relation to larger companies, even if the small companies have an equal or 
even superior product. 
In addition to the pernicious effects of discrimination, blue sky laws are 
substantively unsound. They are early Twentieth Century solutions to 
Nineteenth Century problems. They subject those under their jurisdiction to 
rules and regulatory attitudes that are descended from the traditions of an 
outmoded philosophy of merit regulation.3 Such paternalistic and archaic  
rules and attitudes respecting capital formation simply have no place in the 
Twenty-First Century, with its inexpensive and instantly available investment 
information and financial reporting systems. Blue sky laws, in short, amount 
to the regulatory equivalent of a buggy whip factory. 
Three years of experience since the enactment of NSMIA demonstrates 
what most of us already understood: the states and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission are either unable or unwilling to move society to a 
single, unified, and balanced set of rules respecting capital formation. Only 
further Congressional intervention, therefore, can eradicate the insidious 
remnants of state control over capital formation. 
The purpose of this Article is to argue that Congress, notwithstanding the 
significant problems illuminated by public choice theory and interest group 
analysis,4 should complete the work it started with NSMIA by entirely 
 
 
 3. Determining exactly how many states engage in merit regulation is difficult because, for 
example, “[t]here is . . . no universally agreed upon definition of merit regulation.” Ad Hoc Subcomm. 
on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., Report on State Merit Regulation of 
Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 787 (1986) [hereinafter Report on State Merit Regulation]. 
Nonetheless, the Report on State Merit Regulation reported in 1986 that “a majority of the states have 
merit language in their statutes.” Id. at 790. In 1997 this author reported that in a sample of five states 
(representing approximately 10% of the blue sky jurisdictions), all had statutes containing merit 
standards. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption 
Failure, 22 J. CORP . L. 175, 186 n.65 (1997). In 1997 the Commission reported that “approximately 
40 states undertake a merit review.” Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Report on the Uniformity of 
State Regulatory Requirements for Offerings of Securities That Are Not “Covered Securities,” (Oct. 
11, 1997) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm> [hereinafter SEC Report on Uniformity]. 
 4. Landes and Posner provide the following description of the application of public choice 
theory, or as it is often called, interest group analysis, to the legislative process: 
In the economists’ version of the interest -group theory of government, legislation is supplied to 
groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation. The price that the winning 
group bids is determined both by the value of legislative protection to the group’s members and 
the group’s ability to overcome the free-rider problems that plague coalitions. Payment takes the 
form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright 
bribes. In short, legislation is “sold” by the legislature and “bought” by the beneficiaries of the 
legislation. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
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preempting state control over capital formation. Only in this manner is it 
possible to reach the goal of a modern, fair, and efficient regulatory scheme 
for capital formation. 
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE “PROGRESS” OF STATE BLUE SKY LAWS AND 
WHERE WE ARE TODAY 
To understand current blue sky regulations, brief comments on the history 
of blue sky laws and their relationship to the enactment of federal securities 
regulation are helpful. Because able scholars previously have provided a 
good look at and interesting explanations for the enactment of blue sky laws,5 
however, only the briefest historical discussion is needed here. 
The first point is simply to note that blue sky laws predate the Securities 
Act of 1933 (1933 Act). The first modern state blue sky law was enacted by 
Kansas in 1911,6 and other states quickly followed Kansas’ lead by enacting 
similar provisions governing capital formation.7 The first piece of modern 
 
 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975). Two outstanding discussions of public choice theory 
applied to the legislative process can be found in Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 T EX. L. REV. 873, 873-901 (1987) and Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-233 (1986). 
 5. See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958) (providing the 
historical background for enactment of blue sky laws); 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 29-50 (3d ed. 1989) (explaining the historical developments that led to state blue sky 
laws); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 
348-89 (same). 
 Authors often appear to assume that extensive fraud in the securities market was a significant 
factor leading to blue sky laws. See, e.g., JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW 
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 9 (1971) (“[A]lthough the amount of fraud has never been measured, it would 
not be surprising to find an amount of dishonesty among promoters and securities salesmen consistent 
with the wild times.”); Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651 (1982) (concluding that 
“many naive and some sophisticated investors were duped”). 
 Professors Macey and Miller, however, find a history much more complicated than the standard 
accounts would admit. Their assessment of the facts surrounding the adoption of state blue sky laws is 
that “although fraudulent securities undoubtedly occurred during the early decades of the century, the 
standard account that securities fraud was rampant before the advent of blue sky regulation is not 
proven.” Macy & Miller, supra , at 350. The Professors then explain  the advent of blue sky laws in 
terms of “a process of interest group rivalry not significantly different from the process observed in 
many other legislative contexts.” Id. at 352. 
 6. See LOSS & COWETT, supra  note 5, at 7. Professors Macey and Miller provide a wonderful 
account of the situation that led to, and the interesting characters involved in, Kansas’s enactment of 
its original blue sky law. See Macey & Miller, supra  note 5, at 359-64. For a brief discussion of earlier 
state laws that were certainly more limited than, but generally in the nature of, later securities laws, see 
Conrad G. Goodkind,  Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements? , 1976 WIS. L. REV. 
79, 80-81. 
 7. For example, Professors Loss and Cowett report that twenty-three states enacted blue sky 
laws within two years of the Kansas legislation. See LOSS & COWETT, supra  note 5, at 10. See also 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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federal securities legislation8 was not enacted until twenty-two years after the 
initial Kansas blue sky statute, and by that time, blue sky laws were 
pervasive and well-entrenched. 
A second point to acknowledge is the historical difference in the initial 
philosophical footings of blue sky laws on the one hand and the 1933 Act on 
the other. State blue sky laws were qualification statutes9 and were 
essentially consumer legislation administered by agents of the state.10 Blue 
sky laws provided substantive standards to be met by issuers of securities and 
established a regulatory vetting process in which state regulators had to 
approve offerings as consistent with the substantive statutory standards 
before the issuer was allowed to sell its securities to the citizens of the 
particular state. 
The 1933 Act, on the other hand, adopted a disclosure philosophy11 and 
thus subjected issuers to no review of the merits, quality, or price of their 
shares offered for sale. Once the issuer provided the disclosures mandated by 
the 1933 Act, it was free to sell its securities, no matter how poor the quality 
or how high the price of those securities. 
The final observation about early history is that Congress, even in the face 
of such extreme philosophical differences between its new legislation and 
existing state blue sky laws, chose in 1933 not to preempt state blue sky 
laws.12 At one level, perhaps this is not surprising. The country was in the 
depths of the Great Depression, and one can understand the reluctance to 
eliminate any laws designed to protect unwary investors from sharp or 
fraudulent practices connected with the sale of securities. 
Whatever the rationale, when Congress in 1933 began to enact federal 
securities legislation with its different philosophy and made the decision not 
to preempt the area of business capital formation, it sowed the seeds for a 
confrontation between state and federal regulators operating within 
 
 
Goodkind, supra  note 6, at 82-83 n.22. 
 8. Professors Macey and Miller report that, prior to the Securities Act of 1933, “[t]here was 
some federal regulation of securities sales . . . under the postal fraud laws, but the level of enforcement 
was minimal.” Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 348 n.1. 
 9. Thus, for example, the Official Comment to the Uniform Securities Act emphasizes that the 
Uniform “Act, unlike the federal statute, is not primarily a disclosure Act.” Unif. Securities Act 
§ 304*cmt., 7B U.L.A. 566 (1985). See also  Unif. Securities Act § 303*cmt., 7B U.L.A. 560 (1985). 
 10. See, e.g., Joseph C. Long, State Securities Regulation—An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541, 
543 (1979) (referring to blue sky laws as “the first consumer protection statutes”). 
 11. Professor Loss and Dean Seligman provide an extensive narrative and analysis of the “battle 
of the philosophies” that erupted in connection with the original adoption of the 1933 Act. See LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra  note 5, at 171-93. The outcome of the “battle” is described simply by the authors: 
“President Roosevelt chose the disclosure philosophy.” Id. at 178. 
 12. Securities Act of 1933 Pub. L. No. 73-22 (May 27, 1933) § 18, 48 Stat. 74. NSMIA changed 
this section. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/4
p407 Campbell.doc  4/20/01   5:34 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2000] THE INSIDIOUS REMNANTS OF STATE RULES 411 
 
 
 
 
diametrically opposed philosophical constructs and the shadows of different 
histories. Interestingly, this apparently fragile relationship between 
competing agencies and competing philosophies turned out to be quite sturdy 
and thus lasted for decades without serious incident.13 
Over the years, however, some commentators were critical of capital 
formation rules that involved differing philosophies and subjected national 
offerings to more than fifty sets of regulations and regulators. Until the 
1980s, these commentators mainly focused on the matter of merit 
regulation.14 Subsequently, criticism of blue sky regulation became broader, 
in the sense that aspects other than merit regulation began to attract attention. 
At the same time, however, the criticism became more focused on the 
particular impact of state securities laws on the capital formation process.15 
In 1995, what previously was an academic fight in legal journals spilled 
onto the floor of Congress with the introduction of the Capital Markets 
Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995 (Capital Markets Bill).16 As 
initially introduced, this legislation would have preempted all state control 
over the capital formation process, except for offerings made pursuant to the 
Intrastate Exemption.17 
As the Capital Markets Bill, or NSMIA as it was finally be called, wound 
its way through the legislative process, various committee reports reflect 
 
 
 13. Occasionally, of course, disagreements arose. Dean Sargent, for example, points out that 
“some state administrators bitterly opposed [the] expansion of state [ULOE] and federal [Regulation 
D] exemptions and have imposed many obstacles that make the coordination of federal and state 
exemptions difficult and costly.” Sargent, supra  note 2, at 477. It also was no secret that many state 
administrators were unhappy with the amendments to Regulation A, in which the SEC adopted its “test 
the waters” mechanism for Regulation A offerings. See, e.g., Marc J. Steinberg, The Emergence of 
State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 395, 408-11 (1993).  
 14. Even in 1987, Dean Mark Sargent was able to say that “the current debate over state 
securities regulation has focused almost entirely on the state securities administrators’ authority to 
review the substantive merits of registered offerings.” Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation 
and the Allocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (1987). The literature 
on the subject around the time of and predating Dean Sargent’s observation includes Ad Hoc 
Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Comm., Report on State Merit 
Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785 (1986); Goodkind, supra note 6; John F. Hueni, 
Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969); 
James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (1977). 
 15. For example, in 1985 this author wrote an article arguing for elimination of all state laws 
dealing with securities regulation, except for state laws prohibiting fraud in connection with the sale of 
securities. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 
J. CORP . L. 553 (1985). 
 16. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing an exemption from 
registration for an offering by an issuer that is incorporated and doing business in the same state in 
which all of the offerees and purchasers have their residence). Section 3(a) of the Capital Markets Bill, 
H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995), would have preserved state authority over intrastate offerings of 
securities and also would have preserved states’ authority to deal with antifraud matters.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Congress’ intent to eradicate the cumulative effect of a regime that, when 
considered as a whole, subjected the capital formation process to fifty-plus 
sets of laws, regulations, and regulators and to eliminate the inefficient drag 
on capital formation caused by state blue sky regulation. One committee 
report, for example, described the pre-NSMIA situation as involving a 
system of rules “that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and 
ineffective”18 and stated that NSMIA was intended to “eliminate duplicative 
and unnecessary regulatory burdens while preserving important investor 
protections by reallocating responsibility over the regulation of the nation’s 
securities markets in a more logical fashion.”19 
Notwithstanding the breadth of the Capital Markets Bill as initially 
introduced and the high-sounding rhetoric one finds in committee reports, 
NSMIA’s positive impact on capital formation was dismal. Essentially, the 
Act only preempted state jurisdiction over offers and sales of mutual fund 
securities, securities in companies traded on national securities exchanges or 
the NASDAQ National Market System, and offers and sales of securities 
pursuant to certain carefully selected exemptions from registration provided 
by Section 3 and Section 4 of the 1933 Act.20 
The special treatment for mutual funds was, obviously, significant for 
mutual funds and their investors. The preemption also resulted in savings for 
society and thus amounted to sound congressional action. Freeing mutual 
funds from the grasp of state securities regulators, however, had only an 
indirect benefit on capital formation. 
Only slightly more helpful to capital formation was the preemption of 
offers and sales by companies with shares traded on national exchanges or 
the NASDAQ National Market System. Although that provision amounted to 
a wide preemption of state authority over the capital-raising efforts of larger 
corporations, even before NSMIA such capital-raising generally had 
devolved to federal control. This occurred because most state blue sky laws 
or regulations contained a “marketplace exemption” pursuant to which shares 
traded on national exchanges or the NASDAQ National Market system were 
 
 
 18. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996). 
 19. Id. at 39-40. 
 20. Section 102(a) of NSMIA preempts state control over “covered securities.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Act then defines four classes of “covered securities.” These 
include: securities listed for trading on certain national exchanges and the NASDAQ National Market 
System, see 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); securities issued by registered investment 
companies, see 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (1999); securities issued to a “qualified purchaser” (although the 
Act does not define that term but instead delegates definitional obligations to the Commission), 
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); and securities “with respect to a transaction that is 
exempt from registration . . . pursuant to” particular, described 1933 Act exemptions from registration, 
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/4
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exempt from state registration requirements.21 
The value of the third broad preemptive provision of NSMIA, which 
preempted state control over securities offered or sold under most of the 
exemptions provided by Section 3 and Section 4 of the 1933 Act, was 
severely limited by its exclusions. Specifically, omitted from preemption 
were offers and sales of securities under the exemptions provided by Rule 
504, Rule 505, Section 3(a)(11), Rule 147, Regulation A, and the common 
law of Section 4(2). Those provisions, of course, are the lifeblood of small 
issuers, and thus the result of the preemptive regime of NSMIA is that capital 
formation by small issuers continues to be subjected to control under all state 
blue sky regimes, as well as the federal regime. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress, perhaps in response to political 
pressures,22 limited the statutory preemption effected by NSMIA, there is 
some indication that the breadth of the preemption in NSMIA and, indeed, 
the political compromise underlying the statute, may be subject to future 
bargaining, through either Commission action or further Congressional 
activity. With respect to the power of the Commission to affect the scope of 
preemption established by the statutory language of NSMIA itself, Congress 
left the Commission with authority to expand the scope of NSMIA’s 
preemption. This was effected when Congress delegated to the Commission, 
at least in the view of this author, significant authority to expand the 
definition of “covered security.”23 In addition, Congress seemingly indicated 
that it may itself be willing to reconsider the breadth of NSMIA’s 
preemption, unless states get their houses in order. This signal came when 
Congress in NSMIA required the Commission to conduct a study and then 
report back to Congress in twelve months on the state of uniformity among 
the state securities regulatory schemes.24 The Commission submitted this 
 
 
 21. Exchange Exemptions, supra note 2, at ¶ 6401 (reporting 46 states with a marketplace 
exemption). 
 22. Various explanations may be offered for the significant constriction in the breadth of federal 
preemption between the Capital Markets Bill as initially proposed, and NSMIA as finally enacted. Any 
such explanation, however, should include a recognition of the political compromise inherent in 
NSMIA’s final terms. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 BUS. 
LAW. 575, 583-87 (1998).  
 23. NSMIA preempts state authority over “covered securities,” and included in this category are 
securities offered or sold to “qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule.” See 15 
U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1998). In a previous article, this author argued that the Commission 
should infer a broad delegation of power to define “qualified purchasers,” focusing on its statutory 
obligation to define the term “consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors.” 
Campbell, supra  note 3, at 207-210.  
 24. Section 102(b) of NSMIA requires the Commission to “conduct a study, after consultation 
with States, issuers, brokers, and dealers, on the extent to which uniformity of State regulatory 
requirements for securities or securities transactions has been achieved for securities that are not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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report to Congress on October 11, 1997.25 
At the time of the writing of this paper, no further material activity has 
occurred at either the Commission or Congressional levels, although in the 
summer of 1999, one report surfaced indicating that Congress may be about 
to reconsider the scope of NSMIA’s preemption with a specific eye toward 
expanding preemption in a way that would substantially benefit small 
issuers.26 No such bill has yet been introduced, however. 
II. THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
The reasons why Congress should preempt state control over capital 
formation,27 and thus finish the work it commenced in NSMIA, can be 
articulated simply. 
A. The Nonsense of Subjecting Small Issuers to Fifty-Plus (or Even Two) 
Registration Regimes 
Even considered in the abstract, any legal regime that requires the same 
act to be subjected to fifty-plus different sets of laws and regulations appears 
irrational on its face. When one considers that, in this case, an essential 
element of the free enterprise system, capital formation, is the subject of 
fifty-plus sets of laws and regulations governing the same act, the regime 
becomes even more troublesome. 
NSMIA amounts to Congressional recognition of this obvious point. One 
need only to look to various committee reports28 to find that the complexity 
and costs of complying with multiple schemes were the major driving forces 
behind NSMIA. What is impossible to rationalize, at least on any sound 
policy basis, is Congress’ failure to extend federal preemption to offerings by 
small businesses. Arguments that one may offer in support of excluding 
small businesses from the preemptive scope of NSMIA are unpersuasive. 
Presumably, no one would argue that small companies have no 
 
 
covered securities.” Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102(b), 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
 25. See SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3.  
 26. This Weeks’ Highlights [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 5 (Aug. 4, 
1999) Commerce Clearing House reported that the Senate Banking Committee was beginning to 
“work on the Securities Markets Enhancement Act.” Regarding the impact of the proposed legislation 
on the capital formation activities of small issuers, it was reported that it was recommended that small 
offerings under Regulation D and Regulation A be added to the uniform exemption from state 
“registration.” Id. One assumes that this reference to “exemption” should have been to “preemption.”  
 27. To clarify, the argument here is limited to the preemption of all state control over the 
registration of securities. But see Campbell, supra  note 15 (arguing for a more expansive preemption, 
including the preemption of broker-dealer registration requirements). 
 28. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/4
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substantial need for external capital. While one probably is willing to take 
notice of this fact, hard evidence of small issuers’ need for access to external 
capital is available. For example, data collected by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) indicates that a substantial majority of businesses with 
fewer than fifty employees utilize borrowed funds to help finance their 
operations.29 SBA data also indicate that banks make a tremendous number 
and dollar amount of small loans to business, a significant number of which 
are presumably made to small businesses. Thus, for example, during 1994, 
commercial banks, which not surprisingly are a principal source for these 
loans, had nearly five million business loans of less than $250,000 each, 
totaling approximately $156 billion.30 
Perhaps a more persuasive argument against federal preemption over 
capital formation by small businesses can be based on the factual assumption 
that small issuers typically sell their securities in fewer than all states, and so 
subjecting small issuers to blue sky regulation will be less harmful, as small 
issuers will have fewer states (and accordingly lesser costs) to deal with in 
their typical offerings. Thus, for example, if one imagines that small issuers 
usually sell their securities in ten or fewer states, and sometimes in only one 
state, the capital formation activities of such issuers are subjected only to 
between two and eleven sets of laws and regulations,31 as compared to the 
fifty-plus regimes to which issuers in larger offerings may be subject. 
While at first blush the smaller transaction costs faced by such small 
issuers appear to ameliorate the burden on small business capital formation, 
in fact, that appearance is deceiving. The concern here is transaction costs 
that are so high as to foreclose a small business from public capital or, at 
least, so high as to raise its costs of capital to a level that makes the small 
company non-competitive, and it is relative, rather than absolute, costs that 
are important in this matter. Thus, for example, General Motors is better able 
to pay for blue skying a $100 million offering in fifty states than a small 
corporation is able to pay for blue skying a $100,000 offering in three states. 
Because of the relative sizes of the two offerings, the expenses associated 
with blue skying the GM offering are a small fraction of one percent of the 
total yield from the offering, while the costs of blue skying the offering by 
 
 
 29. See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT 1994, at 348 tbl. B.18 (1995) [hereinafter T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994]. For 
additional and somewhat later information about borrowing by small businesses, see U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF T HE PRESIDENT 1996, at 273-80 (1997) 
[hereinafter T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1996]. 
 30. See U.S. SMALL BUS.  ADMIN., T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF T HE 
PRESIDENT 1995, at 306 tbl. B.8 (1996) [hereinafter T HE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1995]. 
 31. The numbers of regimes include the state jurisdictions plus the federal jurisdiction. 
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the small corporation, depending on the circumstances, could amount to 
thousands of dollars, or a significant percentage of the total yield from that 
offering. 
Ironically, under NSMIA, General Motors, in connection with its $100 
million offering, is required to comply with only one regime, the federal 
securities laws, because NSMIA preempted state control over securities 
traded on certain national exchanges;32 a small issuer attempting to raise 
$100,000 by offering in three contiguous states, on the other hand, must 
comply with four regimes. After NSMIA, therefore, small corporations are 
disadvantaged in relation to large corporations not only in terms of the 
absolute dollars each must pay in blue sky costs but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, in terms of their transaction costs as a percentage of the yield 
from the offering.33 
One is able to offer, at least, another possible but even more troubling 
explanation for the failure to preempt state control over the capital-raising 
activities of small corporations. This explanation, simply stated, is that rule 
makers, in today’s world of multi-national corporations and multi-billion 
dollar acquisitions, do not consider small businesses to be very important. So, 
while regulators and other makers of economic rules may, for political 
reasons, mouth a concern for small businesses, their perception of the relative 
insignificance of small businesses generates an attitude of benign neglect and 
a focus of regulatory and other rule -making energies on the seemingly more 
important, and certainly more exciting and higher profile, activities of larger 
corporations. 
To the extent this unarticulated line of thinking undergirds the failure to 
preempt state control over the capital formation activities of small businesses, 
it is shameful and without factual support. Indeed, empirical studies indicate 
that the contributions of small businesses to the national economy are 
significant, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the importance of small 
businesses may even exceed their importance as reflected by such empirical 
studies. 
According to data assembled by the Small Business Administration, the 
 
 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 33. The picture is actually even worse for the small issuer, as it has another blue sky expense that 
it must pay. Specifically, small issuers must be concerned that the persons they use to effect the sale of 
their securities do not run afoul of the state (and federal) obligations to register as brokers, dealers, 
agents, etc. This can be a significant problem for small issuers, because they usually do not utilizing 
professional underwriters in their offerings, who can be assumed to be registered properly both at the 
national level and the state level as brokers, dealers, agents, etc. General Motors, on the other hand, 
will rely on professional underwriters and thus will not have to worry about this matter. See Campbell, 
supra  note 15, at 567-75 (advocating federal preemption of broker-dealer registration requirements). 
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smallest firms, those with fewer than twenty employees, employ around 18 
million workers in the United States, and this amounts to about twenty 
percent of the total number of jobs available in this country. There are 
approximately 4.5 million of these very small firms.34 Firms with fewer than 
100 employees (which includes, of course, all firms with fewer than twenty 
employees) employ a total of about 36 million workers, which amounts to 
nearly thirty-nine percent of the total number of jobs in the United States.35 
Obviously, such huge numbers eviscerate any claim of insignificance of 
small businesses. 
Other data and estimates help paint the picture of the impact of small 
businesses, suggesting, for example, that small firms create a 
disproportionately large number of new jobs as compared to larger firms.36 
Other, somewhat more anecdotal studies estimate that small businesses, as 
compared to larger businesses, generate a disproportionally large percentage 
of manufacturing product innovations.37 
The picture that emerges, therefore, is that of a material portion of the 
economy which is subjected to disproportionately burdensome and expensive 
rules respecting capital formation. The result is not only unfair to small 
entrepreneurs but also broadly inefficient in society. Resources are 
misallocated, services are provided by relatively less efficient firms, and the 
full benefits of the American entrepreneurial spirit are less likely to be 
achieved. 
B. Neither the States nor the Commission Will Provide Remedies 
Society could remedy the problems discussed above in one of two ways. 
The first is for all fifty states to achieve uniformity among their individual 
 
 
 34. See STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994, supra  note 29, at 164 tbl. A.4. Interestingly, only about 
500,000 firms in the United States employ more than twenty employees. These larger firms, however, 
employ 80% of all workers.  See id. For information on prior years, see id. at 244 tbl. A.11 (indicating 
that these numbers and percentages have been fairly constant in recent years). In terms of total payroll, 
in 1991, firms with fewer than 20 employees paid approximately $381.5 billion (17.8% of the total 
payroll for all firms). See id. at 164 tbl. A.4. 
 35. See id. at 164 tbl. A.4, 244 tbl. A.11. See also id. at 244 tbl. A.11 (reporting similar figures in 
other recent years) . 
 36. For example, in 1993, the number of jobs created in the top 15 industries dominated by small 
businesses (730,000) amounted to over three times the number of jobs created in the top 15 industries 
dominated by large businesses (196,000). See id. at 54 tbl. 1.13. See also id . at 300 tbl. A.26 (similar 
information on prior periods). In this case, an industry is considered to be dominated by small 
businesses if at least 60% of all firms have fewer than 500 employees. See id . at 300. 
 37. See id. at 15 (“Small firms have been estimated by the Futures Group to be responsible for 55 
percent of manufacturing product innovations and they produce more than twice as many innovations 
per employee as large firms. They also produce twice as many significant innovations per employee.”). 
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blue sky laws and regulations through cooperative action. This, of course, is 
an incomplete remedy, assuming it could be achieved. Even with total 
uniformity among the states, the capital formation process would still be 
subject to two distinct sets of rules: the single, uniform set of state rules and 
the federal rules. Still, society would benefit if the capital formation process 
were subject only to two regimes instead of fifty-plus regimes. 
The other and more complete remedy is federal preemption.38 In that 
case, of course, issuers and society would be subject to only one mandatory 
set of capital formation rules.39 
1. Uniformity Among States Is Impossible 
One defense that is raised, both explicitly and implicitly, by state 
administrators in response to efforts to eliminate state supervision of the 
capital formation process is the claim that the states have made significant 
progress toward a goal of uniformity.40 Thus, the states may argue that their 
regulatory regimes are not overly expensive to society.41 
 
 
 38. A third possibility could be based on proposals by Professor Roberta Romano to allow 
issuers to select a single registration regime from any of the state and federal jurisdictions. See Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
(1998) (advocating allowing a firm to select the particular securities regime to which the firm is 
subject from domestic state and federal regimes and regimes of foreign nations). Professor Romano 
probably would allow a corporation to choose to be subject to the laws of all 50 states if the 
corporation so desired. One can only imagine that no corporation (or investor, if investors were 
permitted to vote on the matter) in its right mind would opt into such an expensive and inefficient 
regulatory scheme.  
 39. During the 1960s, some scholars began to criticize mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., HENRY 
MANNE, INSIDER T RADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure 
and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, AM. ECON. REV. Mar. 
1973, at 132; George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964) 
(criticizing the 1963 Report of the Special Study of the Securities Market). Concluding that there was 
“little basis” for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [the 1934 Act] and “no evidence that it was 
needed or desirable,” Benston concludes his piece by stating that “[c]ertainly there is doubt that more 
required disclosure is warranted.” Id. at 153. Professor Loss and Dean Seligman offer a defense of 
mandatory disclosure in their treatise. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra  note 5, 183-93.  
 40. See, e.g., SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, Part III.B.1.a.(I)(C) (“Many of the state 
responses [to an SEC questionnaire soliciting views respecting the uniformity of state regulation] 
describe state actions to increase uniformity, including the Coordinated Equity Review (CER) program 
and NASAA Statements of Policy.”).  
 41. State regulators always supplement their argument about the low costs of state regulation 
with the argument that state regulation is essential for the protection of investors. As the SEC report 
stated:  
Several states emphasized that state blue sky laws have played a strong role in protecting investors 
in their states and promoting the stability and integrity of the states’ securities markets. Certain 
states asserted that the states, as opposed to the Commission, are in the best position to regulate 
small offerings, which are usually local or regional in nature. 
Id. at 9 (describing responses from state administrators to a questionnaire on uniformity initiated by 
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Viewed broadly, the claim of increasing uniformity among state securities 
laws and regulations seems plausible. Approximately forty-one jurisdictions 
have adopted or substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act,42 which 
means that most states have some version of a small offering exemption43 
and also provide for registration by qualification, notification, or 
coordination.44 A significant majority of states have adopted some form of 
the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE),45 most states also have 
adopted the Small Company Offering Registration (SCOR) form,46 and 
NASAA has promoted a regional review program for SCOR filings.47 
State regulators also point to other bases for their claim of increasing 
uniformity. For example, NASAA has promulgated Statements of Policy 
dealing with various securities matters, and a number of states have adopted 
some or all of these uniform policies.48 Finally, the vast majority of states are 
part of a coordinated equity review program.49 
Notwithstanding such apparent gains, meaningful uniformity in fact 
 
 
the SEC).  
 42. Forty-one out of 53 jurisdictions(the 50 states plus the District of Columbia, Guam, and 
Puerto Rico) have “adopted or substantially adopted with modifications” the Uniform Securities Act. 
See Jurisdictions Adopting the Uniform Securities Act, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 5500 (1998). 
 43. See UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 402(b)(9), 7B U.L.A. 600-01 (1985).  
 44. See UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 301-04, 7B U.L.A. 550, 555-56, 559-60, 562-65 (1985). 
 45. The SEC reported in its 1997 report to Congress that “[a]pproximately 30 states have adopted 
ULOE to some extent.” SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, at 9. Nine of the ten states sampled 
by the author of this Article have some form of ULOE. See infra notes 52 and 67 and accompanying 
text.  
 46. North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Reports lists 43 “states that 
have, either officially or unofficially, adopted the SCOR registration program or that recognize the 
filing of Form U-7.” State Adoptions of Small Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-
7, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 267 (May, 1996). The Commission reported to Congress in 1997 that 
“[t]hirty-six states reported that they have adopted the SCOR form. Another four states accept filings 
on the SCOR form although the form has not been formally adopted.” SEC Report on Uniformity, 
supra  note 3, at 16. For a complete description of the form and the requirements respecting the use of 
the SCOR form, see NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 411 (Nov. 1999), and NASAA Small Company Offering 
Registration (SCOR) Manual, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 416 (Dec. 1999). 
 47. Under this program, “a group of states in close geographical proximity to one another agree 
to permit one securities regulator in the region to lead the review of the form and communicate 
comments to the issuer.” SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, at 16. 
 48. As a result of a survey of state administrators, the SEC reported: “Of the 46 states responding 
to the survey, 28 states indicated that they have adopted or apply some or all of the NASAA 
Statements of Policy.” SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, at 14.  
 49. “Of the states that register offerings eligible to use CER, all but  four are currently 
participating in CER.” NASAA Coordinated Equity Review Program , NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 10,001 
(Dec. 1998). Under this program, certain equity offerings are eligible for a coordinated state review 
pursuant to which all individual state comments are transmitted through two “lead states”—one a merit 
state and one a non-merit state. These lead states then deal with the issuer to work out the comments of 
the individual states and ultimately clear the offering on behalf of all participants. For a description of 
the coordinated equity review program, see SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, Part 
III.B.1.a.ii(A). 
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continues to elude the states. Consider, for example, from the foregoing list 
of cooperative actions among the states, the question of whether the small 
offering exemption, which is part of the Uniform Securities Act, is in fact 
uniform among the states. The small offering exemption under the Uniform 
Securities Act provides a transactional exemption from registration for 
offerings by an issuer to no more than ten offerees in a twelve month period, 
provided that the purchasers take for investment and that no commission is 
paid in connection with the sale.50 
In the first place, of course, not all states have adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act,51 and even those that have adopted the Uniform Act often 
incorporate their own idiosyncratic twists into the uniform small offering 
exemption. Thus, among a ten-state statistical sample,52 one state has no 
small offering exemption,53 and in the other nine states, the terms of the small 
offering exemption are less than uniform. One variation concerns who must 
be counted to establish the upper limits of the exemption. For example, 
among the nine states from the sample with a small offering exemption, one 
state determines the availability of the small offering exemption by reference 
to offerees,54 seven states determine the availability of the exemption by 
reference to purchasers,55 while one state’s criterion is the number of 
stockholders following the offering.56 
States also differ in their limit on the maximum number of offerees or 
purchasers (or stockholders) permitted under the small offering exemption. 
Maryland, for example, permits ten purchasers,57 while Illinois permits 
 
 
 50. See Unif. Securities Act § 402(b)(9), 7B U.L.A. 601-02 (1985).  
 51. See supra note 42, and accompanying text. 
 52. The author of this Article examined the laws and regulations of the following ten states: 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan. 
This statistical sample includes the author’s home state of Kentucky and the nine states that fall nearest 
to Kentucky in the alphabet.  
 53. Louisiana has no small offering exemption. Louisiana does, however, have a private offering 
exemption available for offerings that are exempt from federal registration under § 4(2) of the 1933 
Act. See LA. ADMIN.  CODE tit. 64, § 705 (Supp. 1987). One of the further conditions for the 
exemption, however, is that there be no more than 35 purchasers during any 12-month period. See id. 
 54. Massachusetts calculates its small offering exemption by offerees. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
110A § 402(b)(9) (1998). 
 55. See 815 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/4 (West 1999); IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2(b)(10) (1989); IOWA 
CODE § 502.203 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410 
(Michie 1995); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.10 (1999); MICH . COMP . LAWS ANN. 
§ 451.802(b)(9)(D)(2),(3) (West 1989). 
 56. The limit on the number of security holders permitted under Maine’s small offering 
exemption is either 10 or 25, depending on certain factors, including the level of disclosure made by 
the issuer. See ME. REV. ST. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502(2)(P), Q) (West 1999). 
 57. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.11(c). 
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thirty-five purchasers.58 States also have different counting regimes for the 
small offering exemption. Of the nine states from the sample with a small 
offering exemption, two states count universally (i.e., count both intrastate 
and interstate offerees and/or purchasers),59 four states count only intrastate 
transactions,60 and three states allow issuers to choose whether to count based 
on intrastate transactions or universally.61 
The sample reveals other variations in the small offering exemption. Six 
states provide an individualized informal procedure through which issuers 
can petition for relief from some or all of the conditions in the small offering 
exemption.62 Finally, seven states require some filing in connection with the 
utilization of the small offering exemption.63 
Now consider the ULOE. The ULOE provides an exemption from state 
registration requirements for offers and sales made under Securities Act 
Rules 505 or 506, provided that the issuer meets all the requirements of one 
of those rules and certain additional requirements, such as a suitability or 
sophistication requirement for all nonaccredited investors.64 
Preliminarily, in considering the matter of uniformity among the states 
respecting the ULOE, one must recognize the exhaustive work on the ULOE 
of Professor Therese Maynard, who mounted a withering attack on any claim 
that the ULOE in fact was uniform among the states.65 Professor Maynard’s 
 
 
 58. See 815 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/4. See supra note 56, for an example of a state that has more 
than one limitation calculation.  
 59. Kansas and Maine calculate their purchasers universally. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262; 
ME. REV. ST. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502(2)(P). 
 60. Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts and Michigan calculate their purchasers by intrastate offerees. 
See 815 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/4; IOWA CODE § 502.203; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 11OA § 402(b)(9); 
MICH . COMP . LAWS ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(D)(2),(3). 
 61. Indiana, Kentucky and Maryland allow issuers to choose between calculation formule based 
on either intrastate transactions or universal transactions. See IND. CODE § 23-2-1-2(b)(10); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 292.410; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.10.  
 62. These states are Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan. See IND. 
CODE § 23-2-1-2(b)(10)(I); IOWA CODE § 502.203(9)(d); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410(l)(i)(6); 
MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.1O(A)(3); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 11OA. § 402(b)(9); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(G). 
 63. These states are Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Michigan. 
See 815 ILL.  COMP .  STAT. 5/4(G)(4); Bradley W. Skolnik, Indiana Securities Commissioner, 
Statement of Policy Regarding Exemptions Claimed Pursuant to IC 23-2-1-2 and 710 IAC 1-13-6 
(visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http:www.state.in.us/sos/security/orpol.html>.; KY.  REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 292.415; ME. REV. ST. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502(2)(Q); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.12(D); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 11OA § 402(b)(9); MICH . COMP . LAWS ANN. § 451.802(b)(9)(D)(3). 
 64. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6201 (Oct. 1990). Other 
additional conditions imposed by ULOE include the prohibition of paying any brokerage commission 
to anyone not registered with the state, “bad boy” provisions, and the obligation to file the federal 
Form D with the state. See id . 
 65. See Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How “Uniform” is 
“Uniform?”—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357 (1987). Professor 
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work, which is confirmed by others,66 is consistent with this author’s ten-
state sample, which similarly suggests a substantial lack of uniformity among 
the states’ ULOE provisions. 
Thus, for example, while nine of the ten states in the sample have adopted 
some form of a ULOE,67 seven states limit their coordination through ULOE 
to offers under Rule 505 and Rule 506,68 while two states also permit ULOE 
coordination with Rule 504 offerings.69 As further examples of lack of 
uniformity, Maryland’s “bad boy” provisions differ from (and apparently are 
stricter than) those found in the NASAA version,70 and Maryland’s 
regulation also does not contain a suitability requirement for non-accredited 
investors.71 Massachusetts and Kansas calculate non-accredited investors’ net 
 
 
Maynard concludes:  
The ULOE was intended to ease [the] burden by providing a uniform exemption in all fifty states 
which would also coordinate with Regulation D. In actual practice, however, the ULOE has not 
achieved its goal. The modifications made by the NASAA member states have resulted in the 
same confusing array of exemptive requirements that existed prior to the ULOE.  
Id. at 504. 
 66. See Sargent, supra  note 2, at 477 (“The additional state requirements vary substantially from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, thus undermining ULOE’s claim to being uniform.”). 
 67. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan 
have some form of the ULOE. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 130.420 (1996); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
710, r. 1-13-6 (1999); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-50.16 (1997); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 81-5-6 (1997); 
808 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 10:210 (1999); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit 64, § 705 (1987); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, 
§ 4.15; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(B)(13)(i) (1997); MICH . ADMIN. CODE r. 451.803.7 
(1999). 
 68. Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Michigan limit their 
coordination through ULOE to offers under Rule 505 and Rule 506. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, 
§ 130.420; IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-50.16; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 81-5-6(a); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit 64, 
§ 705; MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.15; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(B)(13)(i); MICH. ADMIN. 
CODE r.451.803.7. Under NSMIA, securities sold in rule 506 transactions are “covered securities” and 
thus no longer subject to state regulation. NSMIA, supra  note 2, § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) 
(1999). 
 69. Indiana and Kentucky permit ULOE to be coordinated with Rule 504 offerings, as well as 
with Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings. See IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 710, r. 1-13-6(d)(1); 808 KY. 
ADMIN. REGS. 10:210. 
 70. NASAA’s ULOE becomes unavailable for persons convicted of certain crimes, while 
Maryland’s ULOE becomes unavailable for convictions for or pleas of nolo contendre to certain 
crimes. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.15(C)(1)(b). Furthermore, while NASAA’s ULOE may still be 
available if an issuer did not have reason to know of a “bad boy” violation, see Uniform Limited 
Offering Exemption 1.B, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6201 (May 1989), the Maryland exemption provides 
for no such defense to a “bad boy” violation, see MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.15. The Maryland 
regulation additionally disqualifies a target person subject to a U.S. Postal Service false representation 
or cease and desist order, see MD.  REGS.  CODE tit. 2, § 4.15(C)(1)(d), a disqualification not 
specifically enumerated by NASAA. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 
§ 6201 (May 1989). Finally, the criteria for waiver of the “bad boy” exclusions appear somewhat 
different in the Maryland and NASAA versions of ULOE. Compare MD.  REGS.  CODE tit. 2, 
§ 4.15(C)(3), with Uniform Limited Offering Exemption 1.B.7, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6201 (May 
1999). 
 71. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 4.15. 
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worth differently from NASAA’s ULOE and differently from each other.72 
Thus, this author’s statistical sample supports prior scholarly conclusions that 
ULOE provisions often vary from state to state. 
Other claims of uniformity are also problematic. For example, the SCOR 
program, which seems to be a major point of pride for those claiming 
uniformity, is less than completely uniform across the states. Once again, one 
finds less than complete adoption of the SCOR program by the states. 
NASAA Reports, for example, indicates that thirty-six jurisdictions 
“officially” recognize the SCOR form for registration purposes, while 
another seven jurisdictions recognize the form “unofficially.”73 But even 
among the states recognizing the SCOR regime, variations exist.74 Indeed, 
the Policy itself emphasizes in its first paragraph that state securities 
administrators “may waive any standard set forth in this Policy Statement for 
good cause and may also impose substantive standards not contained in this 
Policy Statement,”75 and, therefore, one predictably finds differences in the 
rules of the SCOR regime among the ten states in the sample.76 
 
 
 72. Massachusetts, like NASAA, has a suitability requirement that presumes an investor is 
suitable if the investment does not exceed 10% of the investor’s net worth. Unlike the NASAA 
version, however, Massachusetts excludes principal residence and furnishings from the calculation and 
adds spouse’s net worth to the equation. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(13)(i)(4)(a). 
Massachusetts has an additional provision that, in sales to non-accredited investors or accredited 
investors who are natural persons, the investment may not exceed 25% of an investor’s net worth. See 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 950, § 14.402(b)(13)(i)(5). Kansas presumes that a sale to a non-accredited 
investor is a suitable investment if the investment does not exceed 20% of the investor’s net worth, 
excluding a principal residence, its furnishings, and personal automobiles. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 
81-5-6(a)(10). 
 73. State Adoption of Small Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-7, NASAA 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 267 (May 1996). In its report to Congress in October, 1997, the SEC stated that 
“[t]hirty-six states reported that they have adopted the SCOR form. Another four states accept filings 
on the SCOR form although the form has not been formally adopted.” SEC Report on Uniformity, 
supra  note 3, at 17.  
 74. The description found in State Adoption of Small Corporate Offering Registration Program 
and Form U-7, NASAA Reports (CCH) ¶ 267 is confusing but indicates less than complete uniformity 
in terms and provisions among the states adopting the basics of the SCOR form. After indicating that a 
significant number of states have declared that “issuers filing Form U-7 must comply with the NASAA 
Instructions to the form,” the report states: “Other states have adopted the NASAA Instructions with 
modifications. Still other states have not officially adopted laws, regulations or policies that recognize 
the NASAA Instructions or permit the filing of Form U-7 subject to a state’s own procedures.” Id.  
 75. Statement of Policy Regarding Small Company Offering Registrations, NASAA Reports 
(CCH) ¶ 411 (Apr. 28, 1996) [hereinafter NASAA Statement of Policy]. 
 76. States often differ among themselves and/or from NASAA’s policy regarding the use of 
SCOR in areas such as: (a) eligible offerings (e.g., Illinois permits SCOR offerings for Rule 504 
offerings, see ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 14, § 130.525(a)(8) (1997); Michigan allows SCOR filings for 
Rule 504 and Section 3(a)(11) offerings, see MICH . ADMIN. CODE r. 451.803.11(1) (1999); NASAA’s 
policy permits use of SCOR for offerings under Rule 504, Regulation A, and Section 3(a)(11), see 
NASAA Statement of Policy, supra  note 75, ¶ 411); (b) eligible issuers (e.g., NASAA policy permits 
use of SCOR by limited liability companies, see NASAA Statement of Policy, supra note 75, ¶ 413, 
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Finally, the costs of a SCOR registration77 are often relatively high, and 
the seam in which SCOR use is both legally permissible 78 and economically 
sensible for the issuer is quite narrow.79 As a result, one should not be 
surprised to learn that the use of SCOR appears to be modest. For example, 
again according to information gathered from ten sample states, Iowa reports 
that only four SCOR registration statements became effective in that state 
during each of the calendar years 1997, 1998, and 1999.80 Indiana reports 
that only two SCOR registration statements became effective between 
January, 1997 and August, 1999.81 Information gathered from other sample 
states reflects similarly modest utilization of SCOR.82 
 
 
while regulations of some states, such as Iowa, omit permission for use of SCOR by limited liability 
companies) see IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-50.22(1)(a) (1997); Michigan also further limits the use of 
SCOR by excluding its use by “commodity pools,” “equipment leasing programs,” “real estate 
programs” and “issuers with complex capital structures,” MICH . ADMIN. CODE R. 451.803.11(3)(a) 
(1999); (c) calculation of aggregate offering price limit (e.g., Kansas aggregates sales within the last 
12 months under Rule 504, Section 3(b) or in violation of Section 5, see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 81-4-
2(a)(3) (1997), while Michigan also includes in its aggregation formula sales under Section 3(a)(11), 
see MICH . ADMIN. CODE R. 451.803.11(3)(b)(v) (1999), and Maryland aggregates sales under Section 
3(b) and in violation of Section 5, MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 312(D)(1); and (d) per share offering price 
(NASAA policy requires an offering price of at  least $1 per share, NASAA Statement of Policy, supra 
note 75, ¶ 413, while some states, such as Maryland, have raised the minimum offering price to $5 per 
share), see MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 312(D)(4)-(6)). 
 77. Form U-7 has 118 items that must be answered and includes a requirement for GAAP 
financials (often audited), exhibits, etc. 1 Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) ¶ 5124. The SCOR Issuer’s Manual 
runs for over 90 pages in the NASAA Reports. See NASAA Small Company Offering Registration 
(SCOR) Manual, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 416 (Dec. 1999). When one considers the external legal and 
accounting costs and internal costs (i.e., the costs of employees and officers who must participate in 
gathering and rendering information) generated by such requirements, this author, who has experience 
writing registration statements, would be surprised if total offering expenses were less than $30,000 
and not surprised if the expenses exceeded $50,000. In addition, to the extent the transaction is 
underwritten, those costs, which will be significant, must also be paid.  
 As described earlier, it is relative, not absolute, offering expenses that are significant to an issuer. 
See supra  discussion accompanying note 31. Thus, if one imagines that total offering expenses for an 
SCOR filing, before any underwriter’s commissions, amount to $50,000, expenses on a $500,000 
SCOR offering, before any underwriting commissions, would amount to 10% of the yield from the 
offering. Relative offering costs in that range obviously and significantly detract from the 
attractiveness of SCOR. 
 78. SCOR registration under the NASAA formula is available only for offerings under Rule 504, 
Regulation A and Section 3(a)(11). The use of the Form U-7 is limited in other ways as well. For 
example, petroleum and mining companies cannot use the form. See NASAA Statement of Policy, 
supra note 75, ¶ 413. 
 79. Economically, it is sensible for an issuer to utilize SCOR, or any other option, only  if the 
relative costs are reasonable. See supra  note 77.  
 80. See Letter (e-mail) from Thomas E. Alberts, Securities Exemption Attorney, Iowa Office of 
the Securities Commissioner, to Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Kentucky 
(Feb. 29, 2000) (on file with the author).  
 81. Telephone Interview by Herbert Stapleton with Linda Hayden, Registration Clerk, Indiana 
Securities Division (Feb. 29, 2000).  
 82. For the three calendar years 1997, 1998 and 1999, Kansas reports, that, respectively, 15, 6 
and 3 SCOR filings became effective. See Letter (FAX) from Steve Wassom, Chief Auditor and 
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Another uniformity problem arises from the way states have dealt with 
NASAA’s Statements of Policy. Presently, NASAA lists thirty-four 
Statements of Policy available for adoption by states, covering a myriad of 
matters from cattle-feeding programs83 to commodity pool programs84 to 
offerings of debt instruments by not-for-profit health care entities.85 These 
Policies, however, have not been uniformly adopted by the states. For 
example, while the adoption rate for the various Policies differs, just under 
twenty-one blue-sky jurisdictions, on average, adopt any NASAA Policy.86 
In other words, only about forty percent of blue-sky jurisdictions adopt 
NASAA’s Policies,87 leaving a substantial lack of uniformity concerning the 
subject matter of the Policies.88 
NASAA’s Coordinated Equity Review Program, which provides for 
coordinated review of offerings filed with multiple states, is another example 
of a well-meaning attempt to reduce non-uniformity that, unfortunately, at 
best generates an incremental gain on that score. Although NASAA reports 
wide participation in the program,89 one must, when considering the impact 
of the policy on uniformity among the states, be clear what the program does 
and does not do. Coordinated review does not change the idiosyncratic nature 
of any of the participating states’ laws or regulations. Indeed, the Policy itself 
emphasizes that “comments may . . . be generated independently by the 
 
 
Director of Finance, Kansas Office of the Securities Commissioner, to Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., 
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky (Feb. 29, 2000) (on file with author). Michigan reports that 
a total of 12 SCOR filings (an average of three per year) became effective during the period of 1997 
through 1999. See Telephone Interview by Herbert Stapleton with Karen Wildmo, Attorney, Michigan 
Securities Division (Mar. 1, 2000). 
 One state, Maryland, refused to provide information voluntarily, stating that the Division would 
respond only pursuant to a request under the state’s freedom of information act. See Telephone 
Interview by Herbert Stapleton with Leah R. Schuman, Senior Examiner Maryland Office of the 
Attorney General, Division of Securities (Mar. 1, 2000). 
 83. See Registration of Publicly Offered Cattle-Feeding Programs, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 601-
606 (Sept. 17, 1980). Twenty-eight jurisdictions have adopted this Policy. See NASAA Statement of 
Policy Adoptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ?263.  
 84. See Registration of Commodity Pool Programs, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 1201-1207 (Sept. 
21, 1983). Thirty-four jurisdictions have adopted this Policy. See NASAAStatement of Policy 
Adoptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 263 (Feb. 2000).  
 85. See Health Care Facility Offerings, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 2001-2005 (Apr. 5, 1985). 
Nineteen jurisdictions have adopted this Policy. See NASAA Statement of Policy Adoptions, NASAA 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 263, at 294.  
 86. See NASAA Statement of Policy Adoptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 263 (Feb. 2000).  
 87. The average number of jurisdictions adopting NASAA’s Policies is 20.7. See NASAA 
Statement of Policy Adoptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) § 263 (Feb. 2000). Therefore, with 53 blue sky 
jurisdictions, see supra note 42, the average rate of adoption for the policies is approximately 39.1%.  
 88. In its 1997 report to Congress, the SEC reported: “Of the 46 states responding to the survey, 
28 states indicated that they have adopted or apply some or all of the NASAA Statements of Policy.” 
SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, III.B.1.a.ii(B). 
 89. See supra note 49. 
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various [state] examiners,” as they enforce their particular, state disclosure 
regime, and accordingly “the issuer may ultimately have to resolve the 
comment directly with that particular state.”90 Thus, while the program does 
facilitate efficient review, it does not eliminate the costs associated with an 
issuer’s obligation to research and meet the requirements of each state’s 
particular laws and regulations. 
The next observation about the coordinated review program is that it is 
attractive only for a narrow range of offerings. Indeed, the policy itself 
excludes coordinated review for certain types of offerings.91 Even more 
important to the program’s use (or non-use) is the narrow range of offerings 
in which issuers will elect to use the procedure. Only issuers that are not 
traded on national exchanges or the NASDAQ National Market System will 
ever seek a coordinated review,92 and those companies, because of their 
small size, typically will either be unable to find the professional 
underwriting support to undertake a public offering or be put off by the huge 
expense of a public offering, because they often have relatively modest 
capital requirements. Thus, one is not surprised to find that by late 1999, only 
seventeen coordinated equity review offerings had become effective.93 
The point of this section is not to argue that states have made no progress 
toward uniformity nor, certainly, that states are acting in bad faith. Instead, 
the discussion is intended only to demonstrate that gains in uniformity at the 
state level have been only incremental and further, that one should expect 
nothing more from states’ efforts at coordination. The seductive force of 
sovereignty on well-meaning state rule -makers and regulators who believe 
fervently that they are the first line of defense against the perpetration of evil 
acts on innocent and helpless citizens of their state is simply too great.94 
 
 
 90. NASAA Coordinated Equity Review Program , NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 10,001, at 10,013 
(Dec. 1998). The Policy further warns issuers that: “As the CER process does not encompass all areas 
of regulatory oversight, the examiners may make state specific comments.” Id. 
 91. “CER is not available for Regulation A [,] blind pool or blank check offerings. Issuers should 
note that CER may not be available on all offerings even if the offering fits within the initial screening 
criteria.” NASAA Rep., NASAA Coordinated Equity Review Program , (CCH) ¶ 10,001, at 10,011 
(Dec. 1998). 
 92. This is because NSMIA preempts state authority over all securities “listed, or authorized for 
listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, or listed, or authorized for 
listing, on the national Market System of the Nasdaq Stock market.” 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b)(1)(A) 
(Supp. IV 1998).  
 93. See Telephone interview by Herbert Stapleton with Lynn Naefech, Attorney, Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission (Dec. 2, 1999). The SEC previously reported that as of September, 1997, there 
had been only two coordinated equity reviews. See SEC Report on Uniformity, supra  note 3, Part 
III.B.1.a.ii(A).  
 94. Reporting on the results of its surveys, the Commission stated: “Several states emphasized 
that state blue-sky laws have played a strong role in protecting investors in their states and promoting 
the stability and integrity of the states’ securities markets.” SEC Report on Uniformity, supra note 3, 
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States are unwilling, in furtherance of the cause of uniformity, to subjugate 
their perceived state interests in protecting their citizens from such evil acts. 
As a result, one should not expect anything approaching uniformity in state 
registration regulation. 
2. The Commission is Unwilling to Expand Preemption 
The Commission shows neither a desire for more preemption nor an 
understanding of the inefficiency in capital formation and the unfairness to 
which small issuers are subject in the NSMIA era. 
To illuminate the Commission’s apparent lack of interest in further 
preemption, consider the balance of power between the states on the one 
hand and the federal government on the other as concerns the regulation of 
the offer and sale of securities. Because the 1933 Act did not preempt state 
laws respecting capital formation, states have always had the power to 
neutralize any federal rule that promoted capital formation. An example of 
this is the Commission’s 1992 amendment to Regulation D, which permitted 
Rule 504 offerings to be made by means of a general advertising.95 The rule 
allowing general advertising, which, regrettably, was recently rescinded by 
the Commission,96 could have been a benefit to small companies attempting 
to find capital, because, for example, small companies could have used 
newspapers, radio, or other media to find and solicit potential investors. This 
benefit, however, was entirely neutralized by state blue sky laws, due to the 
fact that the only state exemption from registration broadly available for such 
Rule 504 offerings was the small offering exemption,97 and the terms of that 
exemption could not be met if the offering were conducted through general 
advertising.98 Accordingly, notwithstanding the federal rule on the matter, a 
Rule 504 offering effectively could not be made pursuant to a general 
advertising. State policy respecting permissible methods of capital formation 
trumped the federal rule. 
The preemption in NSMIA, however, changed this balance of power and 
 
 
Part III.B.1.a.ii(D). 
 95. Rule 504 originally was enacted with a prohibition against general advertising. See Securities 
Act Release No. 33-6389, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982). In 
1992, the Commission amended Rule 504 to permit general advertising. See Securities Act Release 
No. 6949 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,439 (July 30, 1992).  
 96. In 1999, the Commission effectively eliminated the right to accomplish a Rule 504 offering 
through general advertising. See Securities Act Release No. 7644, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,114 (Feb. 25, 1999). 
 97. See Unif. Securities Act § 402(b)(9), 7B U.L.A. 601-02 (1985). 
 98. Under the Uniform Act, the small offering exemption is limited to offers to fewer than ten 
persons in a twelve-month period. See Unif. Securities Act § 402(b)(9), 7B U.L.A. 601-02 (1985). 
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thereby eliminated the possibility that restrictive state rules could 
predominate over the federal regime as concerns transactions involving 
covered securities. After the enactment of NSMIA, only the federal 
government can make rules governing the offer and sale of covered 
securities.99 
NSMIA itself defines three classes of covered securities and delegates to 
the Commission the authority to define the fourth class of covered securities, 
which are securities offered or sold to qualified purchasers.100 Thus, by 
delegating to the Commission the authority to define qualified purchasers, 
Congress authorized the Commission to expand the scope of preemption 
through its administrative regulations. This means that the Commission 
finally has the trump card in relation to the states. 
In a previous article, this author argued that the Commission’s delegated 
authority to expand preemption is quite broad, but the author predicted that 
the Commission was unlikely to exercise the full limits of its preemptive 
powers.101 Unfortunately, in the three years since NSMIA, this author’s 
prediction of Commission reticence has proven accurate. Not only has the 
Commission not acted expansively in its definition of qualified purchasers, 
indeed, it has not acted at all. Thus, as of the date of publication, the 
Commission has issued no proposed or final regulation expanding 
preemption through its delegated authority to define qualified purchaser. 
Another interesting issue involves the possible administrative expansion 
of the marketplace preemption. The language of NSMIA’s marketplace 
provision itself preempts state authority over the offer and sale of securities 
listed on certain national exchanges and “ . . . on the National Market system 
of the Nasdaq Stock Market.” NSMIA then goes on to permit the 
Commission by administrative rule to expand this express statutory 
preemption to include securities listed “on a national securities exchange (or 
tier or segment thereof),” if the Commission determines that the listing 
standards for such exchange are substantially similar to the standards of the 
exchanges listed in the statute itself.102 
 
 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998). See also supra  note 20. 
 101. See Campbell, supra  note 3, at 207-10. 
 102. NSMIA pre-empts state authority over the offer and sale of any security that is: 
 (A) listed, or authorized for listing, on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock 
Exchange, or listed, or authorized for listing, on the National Market System of the Nasdaq Stock 
Market (or any successor to such entities); 
 (B) listed, or authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange (or tier or segment 
thereof) that has listing standards that the Commission determines by rule (on its own initiative or 
on the basis of a petition) are substantially similar to the listing standards applicable to securities 
described in subparagraph (A); or 
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Acting under this delegated authority, the Commission modestly 
expanded the marketplace preemption to include securities listed on three 
smaller exchanges103 and in the course of its administrative rule -making 
received a letter of comment requesting an expansion of the marketplace 
preemption to include shares traded on the Nasdaq SmallCap Market. The 
author of the letter of comment argued that the SmallCap listing standards 
met the statutory criteria of “substantially similar” and that the expansion of 
preemption would “further the Commission’s policy of simplifying securities 
regulation for small businesses and would lower the costs for small 
businesses in complying with federal and state regulations.”104 The 
Commission, however, rejected the request.105 
Sadly, the Commission’s lack of interest in any aggressive regulatory 
expansion of NSMIA’s preemption is not surprising and is consistent with 
this author’s view that the Commission, an otherwise fine and honorable 
agency, has shown over the years a lack of sensitivity to or expertise 
concerning small businesses. The Commission, for example, has a long 
history that includes significant blunders in rules affecting small issuers.106 
 
 
 (C) is a security of the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security to a 
security described in subpragraph (A) or (B).  
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).  
 103. The Commission acted by rule. Rule 146(b) states:  
(1) For purposes of Section 18(b) of the Act (5 U.S.C. § 77r), the Commission finds that the 
following national securities exchanges, or segments or tiers thereof, have listing standards that 
are substantially similar to those of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the American 
Stock Exchange (“Amex”), or the National Market System of Nasdaq Stock Market 
(“Nasdaq/NMS”), and that securities listed on such exchanges shall be deemed covered securities:  
 (i) Tier I of the Pacific Exchange, Incorporated;  
 (ii) Tier I of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Incorporated; and  
 (iii) The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated.  
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b) (1999). Rule 146(b) was first proposed by the Commission in June of 1997, 
see Securities Act Release No. 7422, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,945 (June 
10, 1997), and finally adopted in Securities Act  Release No. 7494, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,001 (Jan. 21, 1998). 
 104. Securities Act Release No. 7494, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,001 
(Jan. 21, 1998). 
 105. The reasons the Commission gave for its rejection include: (1) that the initial Commission 
release did not solicit comments on expansion of preemption to include SmallCap shares; (2) that some 
listing standards for SmallCap markets “differ significantly” from the other national markets; (3) that 
the new, more stringent SmallCap listing standards would not be in effect for some months; and (4) the 
Commission may revisit this matter. See Securities Act Release No. 7494, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,001, at 80,104 (Jan. 21, 1998). 
 Late in 1998, Ira L. Kotel, a New York attorney who made the original request to expand the 
marketplace exemption to include SmallCap securities, again made the same request. See This Week’s 
Highlights, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) no. 1833, ¶ 5 (Aug. 26, 1998).  
 106. This author has described elsewhere the blunders from earlier periods. See generally 
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: Practical 
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As a related matter, the Commission has always seemed disposed to thinks 
the worst of small businesses and the motives of their managers and, 
accordingly, has resolved most factual uncertainties against small businesses. 
The 1999 amendment to Rule 504, previously mentioned, is a classic 
example of this latter point. Prior to that amendment, Rule 504 permitted 
general advertising and unlimited resales in connection with Rule 504 
offerings.107 The 1999 amendment, however, reversed the Commission’s 
position on those matters and thus severely limited the particular Rule 504 
offerings in which general advertising and unlimited resales were 
permitted.108 
This change by the Commission in Rule 504 appears to be based on 
limited data respecting the breadth of harms caused specifically by general 
advertising and unlimited resales and amounts to a misdirected response to a 
problem for which society already has a complete remedy. Indeed, the 
Commission’s proffered evidence109 of abuse from general advertising and 
unlimited resales consists of a small number of cases that clearly involve 
violations of existing federal antifraud provisions.110 It is difficult to see, 
therefore, how denying small issuers the right to advertise, for example, is the 
appropriate regulatory response to illegal conduct by an apparently small 
portion of issuers relying on Rule 504, especially when one considers that 
such illegal conduct presently carries significant civil penalties and criminal 
sanctions. Perhaps even more troublesome, the Release also shows no 
 
 
Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 Duke L.J. 1139 [hereinafter Campbell, Plight I]; Rutheford 
B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging 
Problems that Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J. 127, 135-62 (1985-86) [hereinafter Campbell, Plight II]. 
One old but continuing blunder and another more recent blunder are worth noting. The first is the 
continuing unavailability of section (k) of Rule 144 for resales of restricted securities by control 
persons. This author is convinced that the Commission does not understand the disproportionate and 
unfortunate impact this rule has on small issuers. See id. at 157-62. Second, the recent amendment to 
Regulation D basically prohibiting general advertising in connection with a Rule 504 offering is a 
major blunder. See discussion infra accompanying notes 106-110. 
 107. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1997). 
 108. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1999). The current rule permits general advertising and 
unlimited resales only when offers and sales are made either pursuant to applicable state law requiring 
registration of the offering and delivery of a prospectus or pursuant to applicable state law providing 
for an exemption for sales to “accredited investors” and permitting a general solicitation of such 
“accredited investors.” Id. 
 109. The Commission cites five cases apparently involving resale problems and three cases 
apparently involving general advertising problems. Securities Act Release No. 7644, [1999 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,114, at 81,771 (Feb. 25, 1999). With regard to the significance 
of these cases to the overall use of Rule 504, the Commission reports that in 1998, 2,988 Form D’s 
were filed for Rule 504 offerings. Id. ¶ 86,114, at 81,775. 
 110. The Commission refers to the problems in these cited cases as involving “manipulation of the 
over-the-counter markets” and “illegal practices,” id., ¶ 86,114, at 81,771, and the creation of 
“artificial market demand,” id. ¶ 86,114, at 81,771. 
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understanding of the special difficulties faced by small issuers in finding 
investors for their stock and the potential benefits of allowing small issuers to 
advertise widely for potential investors.111 
The point here is to dispel any reasonable anticipation that the 
Commission, driven by some sympathetic insight into the special needs of 
small businesses, will use its delegated authority to expand preemption. 
History indicates that even in its more traditional role of developing its 
regulatory regimes for capital formation, the Commission has been slow to 
understand the special circumstances and the legitimate needs of small 
businesses. Thus, one should not expect the Commission to take the non-
traditional step of expanding preemption to benefit small issuers. 
III. THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Since neither the states nor the Commission appear willing and able to 
eliminate the insidious remnants of state blue sky laws, the focus naturally 
shifts once again to the United States Congress. What is the likelihood that 
Congress will complete its work left unfinished in NSMIA by finally 
 
 
 111. Permitting general advertising in connection with Rule 504 offerings could be most 
beneficial to small companies attempting to raise capital. Such small companies, as everyone knows, 
face significant practical difficulties in raising capital from public investors. The small size of the deals 
and the lack of seasoning of the small companies mean that relative transaction costs are high, and 
traditional professional help (underwriters, for example) simply is not available. Underwriting firms 
cannot afford to provide professional help for a $500,000 deal, because deals of that size will not 
support the costs that underwriters face in learning and selling new offerings. As a result, managers of 
small companies are inevitably on their own to find equity investors for their companies. Restricting 
these companies by not allowing them, for example, to use the public media to find and solicit offerees 
will sound the death knell for many small offerings.  
 While perhaps less important than the prohibition on general advertising, the Commission’s 
elimination of free transferability for Rule 504 stock is nonetheless significant and once again points 
out the Commission’s lack of sensitivity to the circumstances and importance of small businesses. 
Consider, for example, the fact that investors in small businesses have fewer regulatory resale 
opportunities for restricted securities than do investors in larger businesses. Most obvious in this 
regard is the limited availability of Rule 144 for resales of restricted securities of small issuers. See 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999). Indeed, as initially enacted, Rule 144 was not available for resales by holders 
of securities in small issuers, because it was impossible to meet the broker’s transaction requirements 
of the Rule. See Campbell, Plight I, supra  note 105, at 1150-53. With the addition of section (k) of the 
Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1999), holders of securities in small issuers could utilize Rule 144, but 
only if they held their securities for one year beyond the holding period applied for the resale of 
restricted securities in larger companies. Additionally, the special provisions of section (k) of Rule 144 
are not available for resales of restricted securities by control persons, another significant problem for 
many holders of small securities. See Campbell, Plight II, supra  note 105, at 157-62.  
 In short, while Rule 144 will nearly always be available for resales by holders of restricted 
securities in larger corporations, the Rule often will not be available for resales by holders of securities 
in small corporations. Moreover, even when the Rule is available, the holding period is more onerous. 
As a result of more limited and thus onerous resale provisions, investment in such smaller corporation 
becomes comparatively less attractive than investment in larger corporations.  
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eliminating state control over capital formation? 
The formidable hurdles of inertia and public choice problems are 
significant in this matter. Little needs to be said about inertia. Congress 
obviously has a perennially full plate and most recently has focused its 
financial attention on the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. At this time one 
simply cannot be certain whether Congress will again focus on state 
securities regulation.112 
If Congress were to overcome its inertia and once again focus on the 
matter of preemption, the way in which the public choice issue might arise 
and its ultimate outcome may be somewhat predictable. Indeed, the ultimate 
outcome of NSMIA itself provides at least an indication of the pressures that 
will be brought to bear in such a case. 
Public choice theory as applied to public rule-making is based on an 
economic perspective and analysis of that process113 and predicts that small, 
cohesive groups in which each member has a lot to gain or lose will be more 
effective in influencing the outcome of public rule-making than will large 
groups in which each member has a small amount to gain or lose as a result 
of the outcome of the legislation. Public choice theory predicts this result 
even if the total gain or loss in the larger, diffuse group is greater than the 
total gain or loss in the smaller group.114 This result is explained by the high 
transaction costs and the free-rider problems associated with collective action 
by the larger group.115 
This author previously observed that public choice theory provides an 
explanation for the outcome in NSMIA.116 Three significant groups were 
identifiable in the legislative process leading to NSMIA. The first of those 
groups consisted of investment companies; the second group was state 
securities administrators, functioning principally through NASAA, and the 
final group was small businesses. The first two of these groups were 
relatively compact groups in which individual group members likely 
 
 
 112. But see supra note 26. 
 113. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4,at 877.  
 114. See Farber & Frickey, supra  note 4, at 873-901; Macey, supra  note 4, at 227-33. 
 115. Establishing and maintaining coordinated activities in large groups will generate high 
transaction costs because there are so many parties involved. Free rider problems also are significant, 
because each potential member of the group will be inclined to attempt to free ride on the group by 
holding back, in the hopes that others will form an effective group, which in turn will generate the 
benefits without expense to the free rider. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A 
T HEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 69-70 (1981) (“Members of the mass public will generally find it 
irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interest on any given issue and moreover 
will be ill-equipped to interpret any information they obtain.”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 4, at 892 
(“The ‘free rider’ problem suggests that it should be nearly impossible to organize large groups of 
individuals to seek broadly dispersed public goods.”); Macey, supra  note 4, at 229-32. 
 116. See Campbell, supra  note 22, at 583-85. 
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perceived that they had much to gain or lose in the outcome of the 
preemption struggle. The final group, small businesses, was huge in number, 
and its members seemingly had less to gain or lose individually. 
The outcome of NSMIA was that the first group, investment companies, 
benefitted substantially as a result of the legislation, because NSMIA 
completely preempted state involvement in the rules respecting the 
registration of securities of investment companies.117 The second group, the 
state administrators, got essentially what they wanted, which was a minimal 
change in function and continued broad and, indeed, primary jurisdiction 
over a significant portion of the capital formation market.118 The third group, 
small businesses, which, to restate, were broadly dispersed but in total 
accounted for a significant part of our national economy, got essentially 
nothing out of NSMIA. 
If Congress were to revisit the preemption matter with an eye to 
completing federal preemption of all capital formation rules, the previous 
NSMIA interest groups would be reduced by one, because investment 
companies have been satisfied. So, small businesses would most likely be 
pitted directly against the state administrators who, operating through 
NASAA, represent a demonstrably formidable force. In public choice terms, 
the challenge for small business (and the rest of us) would be to overcome 
the high transaction costs and free rider problems present in collective action 
by a group as large as small businesses. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
As we move into the Twenty-First Century, one might ask: What is left of 
state blue sky laws? My answer is: Unfortunately, quite a lot. 
Today, state blue sky laws and state securities administrators continue to 
exert significant influence over the capital formation activities of an 
important portion of our economy, specifically, small businesses. As a result, 
small businesses engaged in capital formation are subjected to an 
anachronistic and discriminatory legal regime that leads to inefficiency and 
waste in our national economy. 
While identifying this problem is simple, finding a solution is much 
harder, primarily because none of the empowered rule -makers appears 
willing or able to act. States, for example, are not going to solve this 
 
 
 117. NSMIA defines a “covered security” to include “a security issued by an investment 
company.” 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). NSMIA pre-empts state rules over registration and 
merit qualification with respect to “covered securities.” 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 118. See supra  text accompanying notes 20-24. 
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problem. Certainly, no one would anticipate that all states are about to repeal 
the registration requirements of their blue sky laws. Speculating more 
modestly, one should anticipate nothing more than incremental gains in 
uniformity among the fifty-plus blue sky jurisdictions in the United States. 
Notwithstanding an apparent good faith effort in some quarters, the seductive 
force of sovereignty is simply too strong. States will continue to strike their 
own balances and thus continue to make their own individualized rules 
respecting the offer and sale of securities within their own borders. 
The SEC also appears unwilling to push preemption. This is due, in the 
author’s opinion, primarily to the Commission’s failure to understand, trust, 
and appreciate the significance of small businesses. Such failings by the 
Commission are especially significant as we move into the Twenty-First 
Century, with the easy and cheap access to investment information and 
advice that is a part of today’s world and the continuing importance of small 
businesses to our nation. It is difficult to understand why the Commission 
would not be a strong champion of small businesses, willing to indulge the 
presumption that managers of small businesses are at least as honorable as 
managers of large businesses and thus do not need disproportionately high 
levels of societal supervision and intrusion when they raise money for their 
companies. 
Congress, therefore, appears to be the only realistic hope for the 
elimination of the remnants of the state blue sky laws. While an interest 
group analysis predicts difficulties, there are some signs of Congressional 
action, and, in any event, one must hope that sound economics, good sense, 
and desire for fair treatment will eventually carry the day. 
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